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COMMENT
EXPANDING THE RIGHT OF NONEMPLOYEE UNION
ORGANIZERS TO SOLICIT ON COMPANY PROPERTY:
INDUSTRIAL PARKS AND RETAIL STORES
INTRODUCTION
Whenever nonemployee union organizers attempt to soli-
cit on or near company property and the employer attempts to
prevent this solicitation, a problem of competing rights arises.
The union has the right to disseminate ideas about union mem-
bership,' the employees have the right to know of the organiza-
tional alternatives available to them,2 and the employer has the
right to protect his property interests.3 Where the property is
dearly private, the rights of the owner" usually predominate.5
The nonemployee union solicitors must be allowed to come onto
company property to solicit only if other channels for employee-
union communication are beyond the reasonable reach of union
efforts or if the employer is discriminatorily enforcing a no-solici-
tation rule solely against the union.6 Where the property is clearly
public, e.g., a public street or sidewalk that passes near or through
land owned by the employer, the first amendment and statutory
rights of the union normally predominate.7 However, quite often
property is neither purely private nor purely public. Land which
is privately held is often made freely accessible to members of the
public.' In dealing with organizational activities on such land the
1. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945):
The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and
disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free
speech, but as part of free assembly.
Id. at 532. See also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
2. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) ; NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956) :
The right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of em-
ployees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others.
Id. at 113.
3. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
4. As used herein the word "owner" includes the holder of a lease as well as the
holder of the title.
5. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
6. Id. [hereinafter referred to as the Babcock test].
7. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
8. Consider such properties as privately owned parks, shopping centers, etc., which
have been opened to use by the general public.
451
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courts have often balanced the competing rights of the parties in-
volved. They have generally held that the more an owner, for
his own advantage, opens up his property for use by the public,
the more do his ownership rights become circumscribed by the
constitutional and statutory rights of the users.1 This reasoning
has led many courts to allow nonemployees to solicit for the
union on privately owned property where that property was gen-
erally open to members of the public." Such property has often
been labeled quasi-public and the solicitation has often been called
a constitutionally protected exercise of free speech."
Until quite recently the National Labor Relations Board"
has been hesitant to apply the quasi-public reasoning to nonem-
ployee activities on company property.' 4 It has preferred to rely
on the accommodation of competing interests supplied by the
Babcock test.' In relying on this test, it has usually refused to
9. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 808 (1968); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1821 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Solo Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Monogram Models, Inc., 420 F.2d
1263 (7th Cir. 1969).
10. See generally cases cited in supra note 9.
11. A number of state and federal courts have allowed organizers to engage in
picketing on such property. See generally Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, 891 U.S. 308 (1968); In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79
Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969); Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary
Workers' Union, Local 81, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 894 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1964); Mary-
land v. Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore Crim. Ct. 1959); New Jersey v. Green, 56
L.R.R.M. 2661 (N.J., Bergen County Ct. 1964); Lada v. Barbers Local 149, 71 L.R.R.M.
3179 (Pa., Erie County C.P. 1969); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962). Contra, Weis Markets, Inc. v. Meat
Cutters, 56 L.R.R.M. 2402 (Pa., Lancaster County C.P. 1964); Hood v. Stafford, 218 Tenn.
684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). The picketing in these cases was primarily informational in
character. See discussion note 19, infra. Only Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d
1321 (8th Cir. 1971), has used this reasoning to protect primarily organizational activity
conducted on such property. State courts could not protect such activity without running
a substantial risk of invading a jurisdiction reserved exclusively for the NLRB. See San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 891
U.S. 308, 325 (1968); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
[U]nion organizers in soliciting support through peaceful picketing exercise First
Amendment rights.... The Board here found Central Hardware's parking lots
to be generally open to the public, to have a quasi-public status. The record ...
furnishes adequate support for this finding ....
Id. at 1828.
13. Hereinafter referred to as NLRB or Board.
14. Prior to 1969, only one Board decision allowed organizers to use the property
of the employer because of the quasi-public nature of the property. See Marshall Field &
Co., 98 NLRB 88 (1952), where a private court-way had by its nature assumed the
appearance of a city street.
15. See text at supra note 6.
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allow nonemployees to distribute union information under cir-
cumstances where state courts, applying the quasi-public hold-
ings, probably would have allowed the distribution.'0 Indeed, it
has sometimes refused to allow distribution under circumstances
where the Supreme Court would have been expected to have
held otherwise."-
The 1968 Supreme Court decision of Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza' has appar-
ently changed the disposition of the Board toward such cases.
Logan involved the picketing of a supermarket, located in a
large shopping center, by nonemployee union representatives.
The picketing was more informational than organizational.' 9 The
Court, limiting its decision to whether nonemployees had a right
to picket on this type of private property, found that a consti-
tutionally-protected right to picket existed. The Court cited
Marsh v. Alabama 0 where the business block of a company owned
town was held to be of such a nature as to make the prohibition
of the exercise of constitutional freedoms on the block unconsti-
tutional.2 ' The Logan Court pointed out that the shopping cen-
ter was the functional equivalent of a community business block,22
16. The Board's treatment of solicitation at resort areas is particularly interesting.
Clearly such areas have been opened up by their owners for use by members of the public.
Yet the Board has consistently refused to require the employers to allow such activity on
the parking lots or other areas of such resorts where the case did not fit into the Babcock
exceptions. It is quite possible that state and federal courts would have held otherwise
where the exercise of free speech was involved. For a case dealing with resort activity, see
NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
It should be noted that these resort cases involved primarily organizational activity.
The informational aspects were not prominent. Thus it is possible that such cases could
not have come before state or federal courts initially because of the probable preemption
of the area by the Board. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 286
(1959).
17. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968), allowed picketing which was both informational and organizational on the
parking lots of a large shopping center. The factor of opening the property to the public
was largely responsible for this result. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) where
the distribution of religious literature on the sidewalk of a privately owned town was
allowed over the protests of the owner.
18. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
19. Types of picketing have been identified. Informational picketing is addressed to
the public. Organizational is addressed to employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (b) (7), (c)
(1970).
20. 326 U.s. 501 (1946).
21. The distribution of religious literature was attempted on the premises.
22. 391 U.S. at 325.
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and therefore an absolute ban of picketing or handbilling on the
premises was unconstitutional.2
The nature of the picketing, the shopping center, the audi-
ence of the picketing and numerous policy considerations may
have influenced the Court in the Logan decision. This comment
will focus on many of these factors and will attempt to identify
the various determinants that have led the Board to attempt to
expand the Logan holding to organizational picketing conducted
in areas quite unlike shopping centers. The major Board deci-
sions to be discussed will be Solo Cup Co. 24 in which the Board
unsuccessfully attempted to extend the Logan reasoning to pro-
tect organizational activity in an industrial park, and Central
Hardware Co.,2 5 in which the Board extended Logan to protect
organizational picketing on the parking lot of a large self-service
hardware store. This comment will compare these cases and an-
alyze them in light of the history of Board and court decisions
which have attempted to accommodate the conflicting interests
involved.
I. Solo Cup AND Central Hardware: Two ATTrEMPTS
TO APPLY THE Logan HOLDING
A. Solo Cup-An Early Application of the Logan Holding
The Solo Cup Company was located in the Calumet Indus-
trial District,2 6 which was privately owned and managed and con-
tained the plants of eight companies. The owners had laid out
streets in the CID and had provided street signs, speed zone signs
and water lines.27 In 1966 union representatives sought access to
the CID to distribute union literature to employees of Solo Cup.
The company and the owners of the CID made efforts to prevent
this distribution by enforcing a standing rule against the distri-
bution of union literature2 The NLRB was asked to decide
23. Id.
24. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1968).
25. 181 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1970).
26. Hereinafter referred to as CID.
27. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1968).
28. Id.
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whether this enforcement violated section'8 (a) (1)" of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act.2 9
After balancing the competing rights of the various parties
involved, the Board found the enforcement to be violative of sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. This balancing was commenced by
a restatement of the rights possessed by each of the parties
to the dispute. Relying on Babcock, the Board pointed out that
ordinarily an employer may validly post his property against non-
employee distribution of union literature. This general right may
be forced to yield to the organizational rights of the dnion and
the employees, however, if the union is unable to reach the em-
ployees by reasonable efforts, through other chaninels' 'f com-
munication or if the employer is -discrimiriatorily enforcing an
otherwise valid no-solicitation rule solely against union organ-
izers. This accommodation recognizes that the statutory -right to
self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of em-
ployees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others:?°
About 99% of Solo Cup's employees entered the CID by
automobile. The nature of the entrance to the District made
handbilling at that location dangerous, difficult and ineffective.3 1
Additionally, the employees lived in the Chicago area, within
a radius of from 15 to 20 miles from the plant."2 The union did
'lot have a list of employee names and addresses, 3 and absent
such a list the sole alternative channel of communication be-
tween the union and the employees was the mass media. Use of
the mass media, however, would have been costly and of dubious
value because of the large number and variety of newspapers and
radio and T.V. stations in the area. 4 The Board was of the opinion
29. Hereinafter referred to as N.L.R.A. or the Act 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a). (1) (1970)
provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title.
Section 157 guarantees to employees the Tight to self-organization.
30. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
31. The area was heavily traveled and was often congested.
32. Babcock had implied that employee residential dispersion is a factor to be con-
sidered in determining the availability of alternative channels. See NLRB v. Babcock A
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
33. The lack of such a list was further evidence of the lack of available alternatives.
34. See 172 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1968). This is an interesting point. The channels of
communication were so numerous that their value and effectiveness was doubted.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that all of these factors placed the employees beyond the reasonable
reach of union efforts. Therefore the employer's refusal to allow
the distribution on the premises was a section 8 (a) (1) violation.
The Board went beyond the above reasons in holding the
refusal to be a violation under the Act. It noted that the employ-
er's enforcement was also discriminatory because there was no
evidence that members of the public, other than union organi-
zers, were ever barred from the CID. In support of its contention
that the property was generally open, the Board noted that ice
cream and sandwich vendors had been granted ready access to
the CID. It also mentioned the lack of fences, gates, guards or
signs barring trespassers or distributors. These factors led to the
conclusion that the area, although not fully public, had acquired
the nature of quasi-public property.3 r Logan was cited to support
the proposition that free expression of ideas on quasi-public prop-
erty is protected by the first amendment. The Board found the
CID to be dearly analogous to the privately owned shopping cen-
ter and the normal municipal business district which have been
held to be quasi-public for first amendment purposes.30 For this
additional reason the Board found a violation of section 8 (a)
(1).
The NLRB petitioned the Seventh Circuit for enforcement
of the decision. The court considered the evidence and held that
it did not support the order. It did -not find the CID to be a
quasi-public place and, additionally, it did not believe that a lack
of alternative channels of communication or discriminatory en-
forcement of the rule had been shown. 38
In response to the quasi-public characterization, the court
indicated that the CID was clearly not analogous to a shopping
center or business block. The CID did not hold itself open to
the public, the public had no reason to be there,30 and it was
not the functional equivalent of a shopping center or a business
35. Apparently property acquires the quasi-public label when it can be treated as
public property for a particular purpose. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the
business block of a company owned town was treated as public property for first amend-
ment purposes.
36. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
37. NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 1151.
39. Id.
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block.40 Furthermore, the admittance of contract caterers did not
compromise the private nature of the property. Thus the Logan
reasoning could not be used to protect these organizers. In ap-
plying the Babcock test to the Solo Cup situation, the court be-
gan by cautioning against the expansion of the exceptions that
it permits, and noted that courts have been reluctant to find a
lack of alternative channels and have upheld the right of access
only when a substantial number of the employees reside on com-
pany property. 41 Here it was clear that employees did not reside
on company owned property, and at least one channel of com-
munication-handbilling at the entrance to the CID- was open
to the union. Thus an expansion of Babcock was not warranted.42
The Board clearly wanted to protect the organizational right
of the employees and union members involved. It was apparent
that the facts of the case placed it within the general rule of Bab-
cock-which normally allows the posting of employer property-
and outside of the protection of Logan. Yet the Board saw a
threat to the organizational right and did not feel that such right
should be subservient to the property rights of the owners of the
CID. In its attempt to shield the union's organizational rights,
the Board may have failed to realize that the right being pro-
tected, i.e., to organize employees, does not require a greater
measure of constitutional ptotection than does an appeal or ad-
dress to the public. 3 An appeal made solely to employees, on pub-
lic property, would normally warrant first amendment protec-
tion.44 When that appeal begins to encroach upon the property
rights of the employer, however, a certain amount of the consti-
tutional protection may be lost.4 The nature of the property may
40. Id.
41. Id.; see Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory
Union Activity, 83 HARv. L. Ray. 552,553 (1970).
42. 422 F.2d 1149, 1151 (7th Cir. 1970).
43. Thomas v. Collins, 823 U.S. 516 (1945) makes it clear that constitutional pro-
tection for organizational activity exists.
But .. . espousal of the cause of labor is entitled to no higher constitutional
protection than the espousal of any other lawful cause.
Id. at 537-38.
44. Id.
45. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
[P]eaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is,
absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected
by the First Amendment.
Id. at 313.
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,determine the point where the constitutional protection vanishes
entirely and the speaker is compelled to rely solely on statutory
or other., protections to justify his activity on company property.
Babcock and Logan are both aimed at this type of balancing, and
in Solo Cup the balance on either scale favored the employer.
B. Central Hardware-An Application of Logan to a More
"Logan-Like" Site
Central Hardware operated two large self-service hardware
store's on offstreet enclaves in outlying areas of Indianapolis. 4
Each store employed approximately 125 people. Although the
stores were not technically "shopping centers" they were set off
from the main highway and were bordered on two sides by park-
ing lots. Shortly after the stores opened, the union began an or-
ganizational campaign, the greater part of which was conducted
on the parking lots of the stores. When the employer attempted
to enforce a general rule prohibiting union organizational ac-
tivities on its premises,4 7 unfair labor practice charges were filed.
The Board, accepting the findings of fact of the trial examiner,
applied the legal tests of Babcock and Logan and concluded that
the no-solicitation rule was overly broad.
'Babcock allows union organizers to solicit on company prop-
erty if alternative channels of employee-union communication
are beyond the reasonable reach of union efforts.-, The trial
examiner believed that such channels did not exist. This was
concluded notwithstanding the fact that the union had an 80%
complete list of the names and addresses of the employees of the
store.4 ' The trial examiner considered other factors as well in
reaching the determination which the Board ultimately accepted.
He pointed out that the complexes in which Central Hardware's
46. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 1324. "The company had a no-solicitation rule which it enforced against
all solicitational operations in the stores and in the parking lots." Id.
48. 351 U.S. at 112.
49. 439 F.2d at 1324; see Broomfield, supra note 41. As Broomfield points out, the
Board has normally required the employer to grant access to company property only if
the employees lived on the property. Central Hardware's employees did not live on the
property. Yet the Board found alternatives to be inadequate despite the list of names and
addresses. Broomfield comments on the increased recognition of the fact that alternative
methods such as the mails are not effective substitutes for personal contact. Additionally:
[R]ights of private property are more circumscribed today to accommodate im.
portant civil liberties than in 1956 when Babcock ...was decided.
Id. at 553-54. These factors help to explain the policy supporting the Central Hardware
decision.
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stores were located contained other business enterprises."° He also,
noted that the access of members of the general public to the
parking lots was not barred by gates, guards, fences or signs. This.
led the examiner to conclude that the premises were open to the
general public, and that the enforcement of the no-solicitation
rule against union organizers was a discriminatory application
of the overly broad rule. 1
The Eighth Circuit generally affirmed these portions of the
decisions.2 It began by examining the Babcock and Logan tests
and by distinguishing companies that hold themselves open to
the general public, e.g., Logan Plaza and Central Hardware Com-
pany, from those that do not, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Company
and Solo Cup Company. Central Hardware's parking lots were
generally open to the public and had a quasi-public status. Since
peaceful picketing carried on in a location generally open to the
public is normally protected by the first amendment," and since
union organizers soliciting support through peaceful picketing
exercise first amendment rights,54 the no-solicitation rule which
interfered with the exercise of these rights on quasi-public prop-
erty was overly broad55 and the enforcement of it violated section
8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A.
The court did not discuss the avialability of other union-
employee channels of communication. Apparently it believed
that the facts of the case required the application of the Logan
50. The presence of such stores tends to weaken the owner's claim to security. Their
presence gives the area the appearance of a shopping center. A shopping center is analogous
to the business block of a community, and a business block is a proper place for the
exercise of first amendment freedoms.
51. See p. 474 infra. It is important to mention here that the discrimination involved
was not like the discrimination discussed in Babcock. The exception to Babcock dealt with
a rule that was discriminatorily enforced primarily to disadvantage the organizational
interest. Here the rule was uniformly enforced against all solicitors. However, the rule
was found to be overly broad because it prohibited protected activity.
52. 439 F.2d at 1326-28.
53. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308,313 (1968).
54. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
55. See Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Overbreadth' is a term used to describe a situation where a statute [or, pre-
sumably, a restriction] proscribes not only what may constitutionally be pro-
scribed, but also forbids conduct which is protected, e.g., by the First Amendment's
safeguards of freedom of speech and press.
Id. at 851.
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rather than the Babcock test. 6 The nature of the use of the
land rather than the availability of other channels was the key
to determining whether enforcement of the rule was proper.
Both the Board and court considered the nature of the prem-
ises of Central Hardware to be the principal factor determining
the propriety of the enforcement of the rule. Neither considered,
in conjunction with the nature of the land, the nature of the
union activity involved."" Babcock, Solo Cup and Central Hard-
ware involved organizational rather than informational picket-
ing. 9 Marsh, the case upon which Logan was largely based, in-
volved informational activityY While organizational activity on
public property has usually been protected, similar activity on
private property has usually been unprotected. Babcock would
require access to the property of the employer only if a lack of
alternative channels or discriminatory enforcement of an other-
wise valid no-solicitation rule could be shown. The Board and
the court in Central Hardware apparently believed that Logan
changed this accommodation of competing interests where pri-
vately owned property was made accessible to the general public.
In Central Hardware the Board found that although the
union possessed a nearly complete list of employee names and
addresses, alternative channels of communication were lacking.
If the Board was indeed trying to fit Central Hardware into the
Babcock exceptions, a certain expansion of those exceptions was
a necessary prerequisite. Never before had the Board allowed ac-
cess on the grounds of lack of alternative channels where such a
list was possessed."' Probably the Board and the court were aware
of the inapplicability of Babcock to protect the union activity.
Nevertheless, it is possible that a desire to bring the activity with-
in the statutory protection existed. This may have led both to
apply Logan in order to maintain the organizational rights in the
face of competing private property interests. This application
may have been based on misperceptions as to the extent of the
protection afforded by Logan; for Logan might be seen as ex-
tending the first amendment protection only to primarily infor-
mational activity, addressed to the public, and conducted on prop-
56. 439 F.2d at 1328.
)7. Id.
58. See supra note 19.
59. Id.
60. Id. See also supra note 21.
61. See discussion supra note 49.
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erty so opened to the public as to have taken on a primarily pub-
lic appearance and nature.62 The facts of Central Hardware clear-
ly indicate that the activity was neither primarily informational
nor addressed to the public. They also tend to cast doubt upon
the appropriateness of the quasi-public classification. This is due
both to the nature of the store and to the fact that quasi-public
property is quasi-public only for the purpose of conducting
certain activities thereon. Thus it might be quasi-public for con-
stitutional or' statutory purposes. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that generally neither a constitutional nor a statutory right
for nonemployees to engage in organizational activity on private
ly owned property exists.6 3 It is possible that property that is not
public could not be classified quasi-public in order to allow the
exercise of rights that would be statutorily protected if conducted
on public property. It is, nevertheless, arguable that Logan
changed this previous ruling where privately owned property is
opened up for use by the general public. Such a 'change might
have enabled the Board and the court to protect the organiza-
tional activities on the parking lots of Central Hardware.
II. THE HISTolucAL BACKDROP OF Solo Cup
AND Central Hardware
A. Early Developments
Two decisions in 1940 clearly indicated that the first amend-
ment freedom of speech guarantee afforded protection to.peaceful
picketing carried on in a public place and designed to dissemi-
nate information concerning the facts of a labor dispute.64 In 1941
the Supreme Court noted-that the lack of an employer-employee
relationship would not be s'ufficient to preclude the protection of
such picketing.6 Thus, as of 1941, it was well established that
employees or nonemployees were protected by the first amend-
ment when they engaged in peaceful informational picketing on
public property. In 1945 the Supreme Court indicated that this
62. Remember that the Plaza in Logan was compared to a business block and was
found to be the functional equivalent of the block. Certainly Central Hardware was not
a business block, or part of the functional equivalent of such a block.
63. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
64. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310'U.S.
10G, 113 (1940).
65. A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
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protection extended to organizational picketing as well.,; Picket-
ing conducted on private property, against the wishes of the own-
er was not, however, protected. Those engaged in such picketing
were trespassers and their actions made them criminally and civ-
illy liable. 7
In 1946 Marsh v. Alabama s was decided and a trend toward
expansion of the first amendment protection began. The Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine the status of a busi-
ness block in a company owned town. Clearly the block was not
public; it was owned by a private corporation." Nevertheless the
block had a public appearance and function and was found to
be primarily public in nature.
A Jehovah's Witness attempted to distribute religious litera-
ture on the sidewalk in front of a post office located on the block.
The managers of the town asked that she stop this distribution.
When she refused she was arrested. In reviewing these facts the
Court pointed out that:
[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his own advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become cir-
cumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it.70
Analogies were drawn to privately held ferries, bridges, turnpikes
and railroads which are subject to state regulation because they
serve a public function.71 The Court reasoned that since the "bus-
iness block" was serving a public function and was freely acces-
sible and open to people in the area and those passing through,2
the managers of the town could not curtail the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected freedoms in the business section. Such cur-
tailment violated the first amendment.7 3
After Marsh it was beyond doubt that where the constitu-
tional rights of owners of land were balanced against the rights
of the people to enjoy first amendment freedoms, the latter would
66. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
67. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943).
68. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
69. Id. at 502. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the town.
70. Id. at 506.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 508.
73. Id. at 509.
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occupy a preferred position7 Although first amendment rights
could normally be exercised freely only in public areas, where
a private area so closely resembled a public area as to have be-
come its functional equivalent the first amendment protection
would be extended to safeguard the exercise of constitutional
freedoms in the quasi-public area.75
In 1948 one of the first attempts to apply the Marsh holding
to labor picketing on privately owned property was made. Peo-
ple v. Barisi76 involved orderly picketing against a news company
which leased space in the Pennsylvania Railroad Station in New
York City. After noting that the Railroad was the owner of the
station, the court examined the use to which the property had
been subjected. It pointed to the general accessibility, by the pub-
lic, to the building. "In the station many stores [were] located
where anything from- a hamburger to a dress suit and silk hat
might be purchased. ' 77 The property had taken on a public char-
acter, and by opening up their property to the general public,
the owners of the station made it a quasi-public place and cir-
cumscribed their property rights by the constitutional rights of
the users of the premises.78 The picketing was orderly informa-
tional activity and could not be prohibited.
In the 1940's it became increasingly apparent that the con-
stitutional protection of picketing on public property would not
alone be sufficient to protect the statutory rights of employees
who were isolated from organizational information. In lumber
or mining camps, for example, employees who lived and worked
on company property could be effectively isolated from such in-
formation if the owner of the camp refused to allow nonemployee
union organizers to solicit on his property. Similarly, an employer
might effectively prevent or impede organization by discrimina-
torily applying a nonemployee no-solicitation rule. He could
allow anti-union solicitation and dissemination while prohibiting
pro-union activities on his property.
74. Id. Logan so interpreted Marsh. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
75. Cases beginning with People v. Barisi, 23 L.R.R.M. 2190 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1948)
and culminating with Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) have so'held.
76. 23 L.R.R.M. 2190 (N.Y.:Magis. Ct.'1948).
77. Id. at2191.
78. Id.
BUFFALO LA W REVIEW
In Lake Superior Lumber Corp. the Board"0 and later the
Sixth Circuit 0 found restrictions on nonemployee solicitation dur-,
ing non-work periods and in certain non-work areas to be vio-
lative of section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. In NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co. the Supreme Court,8' overruling a determination
by the Fourth Circuit, "2 upheld a Board decision which required
an employer to allow union organizers to use a company owned
meeting hall for organizational purposes. The hall was the only
suitable place for organizational meetings in the town and had
been available for use by other groups in the community. The sole
purpose of the discriminatory denial had been to discourage self-
organization. The holdings of these cases were combined in 1956
when the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co.84 Babcock involved attempts by a union to solicit on property
owned by the company. The Court pointed out that an owner may
validly post his property against solicitation by nonemployee
union organizers unless a lack of alternative channels of communi-
cation places employees beyond the reasonable reach of union
efforts or the rule is being discriminatorily enforced. 5
Babcock could have been seen as a substantial encroachment
on the traditional property rights of the company owner.88 Con-
sidering the nature of the situations in which this right could be
asserted, however, it is clear that the encroachment was much
less than substantial. 7 Again, considering the limited number of
situations in which the statutory right could be asserted, it is
understandable that increasing attempts were made to apply the
quasi-public doctrine of Marsh to premises where nonemploy-
ees sought to solicit. Unless discrimination or a lack of alterna-
tives was clear, it was more likely than not that nonemployees
79. 70 N.L.R.B. 178 (1946).
80. NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 19.18).
81. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
82. 165 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1947).
83. Stowe Spinning Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946).
84. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
85. Id. at 112.
86. It allowed nonemployees to enter onto property that had previously been closed
to them. See Fairweather, An Evaluation of the Changes in Taft-Hartley, 54 Nw. U.L.
R.y. 711, 725 (1960): "The need of the union has been used . . . to justify a trespass
by a union solicitor or picket."
87. See Broomfield, supra notes 41, 49.
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would fare better by pursuing first amendment protection in seek-
ing to solicit on company owned property. s8
B. Expanding the Marsh Holding: Logan Plaza
In the years following Marsh, many state courts extended
the quasi-public classification to permit informational union ac-
tivities on the parking lots of large, multi-store shopping centers.8 9
Similarly, some state and federal courts, and even the NLRB,
broadened the classification to protect nonemployee union ac-
tivity in certain areas of multi-level or miilti-divisional depart-
ment stores. Beyond these two "business block" like areas,
however, there was little consensus as to the circumstances under
which private property could be considered quasi-public for first
amendment or statutory purposes, and even within these two
areas there was considerable uncertainty.9' In the 1960's a discon-
certing number of inconsistent decisions in various jurisdictions9
resulted in the exertion of increased pressure on the Supreme
Court for a final resolution of the issue of the proper status of
shopping center picketing.
Amalgamated Food Employees' Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plazas was seen by many94 as a response to this pressure.
Logan had come to the Court after both the Pennsylvania Court
of Common Pleas 5 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court" had
found nonemployee union organizers to be trespassing when they
88. Id.
89. Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers' Union,
Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964); Maryland v. Williams,
44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore Crim. Ct. 1959); New Jersey v. Green, 56 L.R.R.M. 2661
(NJ., Bergen County Ct. 1964) ; Lada v. Barbers Local 149, 71 L.R.R.M. 3179 (Pa., Erie
County C.P. 1969) ; Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114
N.W.2d 876 (1962).
90. Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), modified, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1953); Spartan of Plainfield, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees, Local 444, 49 L.R.R.M. 2338
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1961).
91. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers'
Union, Local 31, 50 L.R.R.M. 2963 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d
921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964).
92. See, e.g., cases cited note 114, infra.
93. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
94. See, e.g., 35 BROOKLYN L. Ra,. 101, 102 (1968) ; 53 MINN. L. REv. 873, 882 (1969);
48 ORE. L. Ry. 426, 427 (1969).
95. 61 L.R.R.M. 2425 (Pa., Blair County C.P. 1966).
96. 425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967).
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picketed on the parking lots of the Logan Valley Plaza. 7 At that
time the Plaza contained only two stores but the addition of at
least fifteen others was contemplated. 98 The Plaza had a perimeter
of just under 1.1 miles and was freely open to and used by mem-
bers of the general public. Weis Market, a tenant in the Plaza,
had posted a sign prohibiting trespassing or soliciting by all non-
employees .on its porch or parking lot. Union representatives,
nevertheless, commenced peaceful informational picketing in the
parcel pickup area and the portion of the parking lot adjacent
thereto. 9 The Market and the owners of the Plaza instituted an
action to enjoin the trespassing. The Pennsylvania courts granted
the requested injunction.
The Supreme Court reviewed the Pennsylvania rulings and
concluded that the union organizers had a right to picket on the
premises. In reaching this decision the Court considered many
factors.' 10
The picketing in Logan was within the first amendment pro-
tection,1 ' but the right of the union to engage in this activity
on privately owned property was unclear. The Court cited Marsh
v. Alabama 2. to. support the proposition that under certain cir-
cumstances,.property that is privately owned may be treated as
though it were publicly held for first amendment purposes.' 3 There
97. This case came to the state courts instead of the Board because state-protected
rights were being asserted by the landowner. The rights were not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. But see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959).
98. 391 U.S. at 317-18.
99. Id. at 311. The signs carried by the pickets indicated that the market was non-
union and that its employees were not receiving union wages or benefits. The message was
addressed'to the public.
100. Competing rights and interests were involved. The union had a constitutionally
protected right to disseminate ideas about a labor dispute to the public on property
generally open to the public. This property, however, was privately owned, and the owner
was asserting his right to exclude trespassers.
101. Courts have recognized that picketing includes elements of both speech and
conduct, and the non-speech aspects are not protected by the first amendment free speech
clause. Due to this intermingling of the protected and unprotected, picketing is subject
to controls that could not be constitutionally imposed upon pure speech. See, e.g., Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). Limitations have been placed on the nature and
location of certain picketing. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950);
NLR.B v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). This does not imply
that the absolute prohibition of peaceful picketing is allowed. 391 U.S. 308, 314 (1968).
Generally the non-speech aspects are not so pronounced as to make the first amendment
protection inapplicable.
102. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
103. 391 U.S. at 316.
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were numerous similarities between the business section involved
in Marsh and Logan Valley Plaza, which served as the functional
equivalent of a business block, and which was generally open to
the public in the same sense as was the business block.104 Nor-
mally the owner of private property has the right to exclude from
his land those members of the public who make use of the land
in a way contrary to his wishes."0 5 However, the owner of a
shopping center which functions as the community business block
may not resort to traditional trespass laws to exclude members
of the public wishing to exercise their first amendment rights on
the premises where the purpose of that exercise is to apprise the
public of the manner in which the center is actually being op-
erated."0 " The owners may regulate but may not prohibit the ex-
ercise of such first amendment freedoms.10 7
The Court partly based the extension of the first amendment
protection on the nature and the function of shopping centers in
the United States. It noted the growth of shopping centers as a
consequence of the exodus to suburbia. By the end of 1966, 37%
of the total retail sales in the United States and Canada could be
traced to shopping centers. 08 If first amendment protection were
not extended to peaceful informational 'picketing at shopping
centers, store owners would be able to effectively insulate them-
selves from protests of unfair working conditions or shoddy, over-
priced merchandise or discriminatory hiring of employees by
creating a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores.
The owners of stores located in the inner city business sections
of the community would be unable to similarly protect them-
selves. The goal of free expression could not be maintained if
the shopping center stores had such protection. The incidence of
private ownership should not require such a result.
104. Id. at 319.
105. Id. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1942).
106. 391 U.S. at 319-20. Notice that this holding, if limited to the facts of the case,
is rather narrow.
107. Id. at 320-21. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), where the Court
upheld a statute prohibiting picketing "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably
interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any . . . county . . . courthouses,.
Id. at 616.
108. Kaylin, A Profile of the Shopping Center Industry, CHtALN SToRE AGE 17 (May
1966).
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The Court was not unanimous in deciding Logan. Three
Justices dissented. 10 9 The dissenting opinion of Justice White
was particularly interesting because it raised some of the difficul-
ties that would confront the Board or a court which was attempt-
ing to apply the Logan holding. Thus he noted that the Court
had not made the basis for drawing a line between shopping
centers and other businesses clear. Justice White was fearful that
the majority decision would be a license for peaceful pick-
ets to leave the public streets and to carry out their activities
on private property. He did not believe that an owner forfeits
his property rights by inviting the public to do business with him
on his property, or that pickets thereby have a right to come onto
his property against his wishes to exercise their first amendment
freedoms."' Cases following Logan demonstrated that the fears
of Justice White were justified."'
Prior to Logan a number of state courts had formulated a
rule that enabled them to decide when to call property "quasi-
public" for first amendment purposes." 2 The essence of the rule
was as follows:
The change from a single proprietorship to a multiple com-
mercial area changes 'the very nature of the operation from pri-
vate to public or quasi-public. While a single proprietor would
be entitled to prevent an unauthorized intrusion upon his pri-
vate property, the owner of a multiple commercial complex is
divested of such right by the very nature of the property's phys-
ical appearance. The identity of private property attributed to
a single commercial establishment is forfeited in a large, multi-
purpose shopping center."13
This rule was difficult to apply and often its application led to
apparently inconsistent results. 1 4 After Logan some state courts
109. 391 U.S. 308, 327 (Black, J., dissenting), 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 337
(White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 339-40.
111. See pp. 468-72 infra.
112. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers
Union, Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785
(1963); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114
N.W.2d 876 (1962).
113. 25 WASH. & Ia L. REv. 53, 58 (1968) (interpreting Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, -, 122 N.W. 2d 785, 794
(1963)).
114. Compare Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary
Workers Union, Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964) with
Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
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modified this rule"15 while others abandoned it. 1 6 The overall
result was a broadening of Logan to protect peaceful picketing,
for example, at a supermarket," 7 a barber shop"" and a restau-
rant.1 19 The supermarket was a single grocery store while the
barber shop and the restaurant were part of tiny "shopping cen-
ters." The barber shop, for example, was located in a plaza that
contained a laundromat, a restaurant and one other store which
was vacant.2 0 The restaurant was part of a one story building
which also housed a furniture store.'' These areas were unlike
the Logan Valley Plaza. Nevertheless they were held to be quasi-
public for first amendment purposes. The new rule that has ap-
parently developed allows peaceful picketing in areas that are
held open by the employer for use by members of the public. 22
In the years following Logan, federal courts have had only
limited exposure to cases involving nonemployee picketing on
private property. Three cases, including Solo Cup and Central
Hardware, have been brought to the courts on petitions for en-
forcement of orders of the NLRB. All of these cases focused on
the right of nonemployee union organizers to engage in organ-
zational picketing or handbilling on the private property of the
employer or his lessor.123 In Solo Cup the property was an in-
dustrial park, in Central Hardware it was the parking lot of a large
hardware store,2 . and in the third case, NLRB v. Monogram
Models, Inc.,25 it was the shoulder of a private roadway which
was used by employees for ingress to and egress from an industrial
site.126
115. See, e.g., In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
116. See, e.g., My's Restaurant, Inc. v. Hotel Local 571, 76 L.R.R.M. 2393 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1970).
117. In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
118. Lada v. Barbers Local 149, 71 L.R.R.M. 3179 (Pa., Erie County C.P. 1969).
119. My's Restaurant, Inc. v. Hotel Local 571, 76 L.R.R.M. 2393 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970).
120. Lada v. Barbers Local 149,71 L.R.R.M. 3179,3180 (Pa., Erie County C.P. 1969).
121. My's Restaurant, Inc. v. Hotel Local 571, 76 L.R.R.M. 2393 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970).
122. This would seem to include nearly every retail store, restaurant, etc. Many
courts still require some similarity between the property to be picketed and a normal
shopping center. Compare My's Restaurant, Inc. v. Hotel Local 571, 76 L.R.R.M. 2393
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970) with Lada v. Barbers Local 149, 71 L.R.R.M. 3179 (Pa., Erie County
C.P. 1969) and In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
123. Remember that most courts do not distinguish the'owner from the lessee for
trespass purposes.
124. The store employed 125 and had employee parking lots which had a capacity of
350 cars.
125. 420 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Monogram].
126. Id. at 1265.
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Monogram was the first of the three cases to come before
the federal courts. The court's discussion of the facts was aimed
at bringing the organizational handbilling under the first amend-
ment protection. It pointed out that the shoulder area of the high-
way was subject to an easement owned by the state. Therefore
it was public property in much the same way as a sidewalk is
public property. 127 The handbilling, even if organizational in
character was protected activity, and attempts by the employer
to prevent the distribution interferred with the section 7 rights of
the employees128 and violated section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari of the case.120
The facts of Solo Cup and Central Hardware were previ-
ously discussed. 130 The activity on the property of the Solo Cup
Company was not constitutionally protected because the property
was not public or quasi-public. It was not statutorily protected
because the situation was not within the Babcock exceptions.18'
The union activity at the Central Hardware Company was pro-
tected by the first amendment and the statute because the prop-
erty had assumed a quasi-public appearance and nature. 2 It
was also protected by the statute because it fell within the Bab-
cock exceptions.
Two recent decisions of the NLRB which have not yet been
reviewed by the federal courts have dealt with the organizational
activities of employees on company property. The first of these,
Monogram Models, 33 came to the Board when the employer
refused to allow nonemployee organizers to solicit on company
parking lots. 34 The union had attempted to distribute leaflets to
employees and pedestrians as they entered the plant. This and
other tactics met with little success, and the solicitors sought access
127. Id.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for . . . mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities ...
129. Monogram Models, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
130. See supra pp. 456-61.
131. See text at supra note 6.
132. Id.
133. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Monogram Models, Inc.]
134. The earlier Monogram case had involved solicitation on the shoulders of the
highway. See NLRB v. Monogram Models, Inc., 420 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1969).
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to company owned parking lots. After considering the facts of the
case, the Board concluded that a right to access did not exist. The
accommodation of competing interests provided by Babcock favor-
ed the employer because other channels did exist and no discrimi-
nation had occurred. The "limited success" of other methods indi-
cated that the lack of alternatives required by Babcock was not
present. The fact that the employees lived in a large city did not,
by itself, warrant the granting of access. Other channels existed
and therefore the rights of the employer predominated. The ques-
tion of quasi-public property was not raised.
The second case recently passed upon by the Board, Scholie
Chemical Corp.,135 and dealing with a factual situation much
like Monogram, resulted more favorably for the union. The
Board held the refusal of the employer to allow nonemployee
organizers to solicit on -company property to be violative of
section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. The only entrance to the manu-
facturing company was a road which was privately owned by
innocent third parties to the dispute."" Although the, union had
the names and addresses of 220 of the 350 employees of the
company, these employees lived in the Chicago area and this made
informal contact-such as could be achieved in a small town or
rural community-between the employees and the union organ-
izers, impossible. Other effective channels did not exist and there-
fore the Board found the refusal to allow access to be violative of
section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. Again, no question of quasi-public
property arose.
The significance of these two decisions lies in their balance
of competing rights. It is possible that these cases, when read in
conjunction with the three prior cases1.37 indicate a belief on the
part of the Board that employees are entitled to access to a spe-
cific channel of communication involving personal contact be-
tween employees and union organizers. Where the activities of
the union, if restricted to public property, would be unable to
provide this contact, the balancing of competing rights requires
that the union representatives be granted access to the property
of the employer. In the cases from Marsh to Logan, courts rec-
135. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1971).
136. The road was owned by another manufacturing plant which was located in the
same area as Scholle.
137. Monogram, Solo and Central.
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ognized a right to engage in activity protected by the first amend-
ment or by statutes on quasi-public as well as public property.",,
Possibly the Board has taken these cases, in conjunction with
Babcock, to imply that where nonemployees seek to engage in
organizational activity, the statutory rights of the employees re-
quire the employer to make certain areas of his property avail-
able to nonemployee organizational efforts if, in the absence of
such availability, the employees will be placed beyond the effec-
tive reach of reasonable union efforts.
III. Solo Cup AND Central Hardware AS EXTENSIONS OF STATU-
TORY PROTECTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
The N.L.R.A. was enacted to minimize industrial strife.80
The drafters of the Act were of the opinion that this could be
accomplished "if employers, employees and labor organizations
. . . [would] recognize under law one another's legitimate rights
in their relations with each other .... ,,140 The Act was designed
to prescribe the legitimate rights of the groups involved and to
provide orderly procedures to protect the rights of each group
from interference by the others.
The N.L.R.A. gave employees the right to self-organiza-
tion,' with which the employer could not lawfully interfere.142
This right was virtually meaningless, however, if employees were
not given the opportunity to hear of the benefits of self-organiza-
tion from outsiders.4' It was recognized, therefore, that nonem-
ployee union organizers had to be allowed to provide organiza-
tional information to employees in order to safeguard the organ-
izational rights of the employees." The protection for such organ-
138. In Marsh the handbilling was allowed despite the fact that a public roadway
was located within thirty feet of the place from which the distribution was attempted.
This leads to the conclusion that the exercise of first amendment rights cannot be barred
in a quasi-public area simply because a public area is located nearby. Logan gives addi-
tional support to this conclusion.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (b) (1970).
140. Id.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title ....
143. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
144. Id.
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izers varied according to the circumstances. If they sought to ap-
prise the general public of the nature of the conditions under
which the employees were working, and this activity was conduct-
ed on public property, it was protected both by the Constitution
and by the statute.145 Similarly, if they sought to organize the em-
ployees on public property and made no appeal to the public,
the activity was protected by the Constitution and statute. 14 Marsh
and Logan implied that an appeal addressed to the public, in-
cluding employees, on either public or quasi-public property
would be both constitutionally and statutorily protected. Babcock
indicated that under certain circumstances organizers would be
granted access to the private property of the employer. Such ac-
cess was required, however, only where the company was situ-
ated or operated so as to place the employees beyond the reach
of reasonable union efforts.'47 Solo Cup and Central Hardware, as
decided by the Board, could be seen as having expanded Babcock
where the employer holds his private property out to the public
and where, in the absence of access, the employees would be
placed beyond the effective reach of reasonable union efforts.
The treatment received by these cases from the courts of appeals
evidences a hesitance to accept this expansion. The courts do not
wish to sacrifice the property interests of the employer to protect
the statutory rights of the employees and organizers. They will
do this, however, where either a clear threat to those rights exists
or a certain weakening of the employer's claim to privacy and
security is apparent due to a "dedication" of some of the prop-
erty rights of the employer to the public. 48
A. The Threat to Organizational Rights v. The Security Right
As was noted earlier, the NLRB has recognized the right
of nonemployees to engage in organizational activity. The N.L.
R.A. created this right and enables the Board to protect it from
unlawful employer interference. Interference can be either ac-
tive or passive. Therefore an employer may be held to be violating
section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. when he refuses to allow non-
employees to come onto his property to solicit for the union if
145. See Thornhil v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). If activity is protected by
the Constitution, interference with that activity violates section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A.
146. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
147. See supra p. 457.
148. See supra p. 459.
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the result of this is to stifle the organizational rights of the em-
ployees.
In both Solo Cup and Central Hardware, the threat to or-
ganization was unclear. The Board cited the ineffectiveness of
handbilling at the plant entrances, broadcasting over the mass
media, and attempting personal contacts at the homes of the
employees as evidence of a lack of alternatives. In Solo Cupr it
noted the lack of a list of employee names and addresses. In
Central Hardware the Board found a threat to organization de-
spite the fact that the union had a nearly completed list of em-
ployee names and addresses. Quite possibly these determinations
were based on ineffectiveness rather than unavailability. The
facts of both cases make it quite clear that the available alterna-
tives were of dubious value. The Board may have concluded that
they were so valueless as to make the organizational rights of the
employees meaningless. This represents a substantial departure
from prior applications of Babcock, which reauired access only
if an almost total lack of alternatives could be shown. 49
The discrimination mentioned in Babcock was of a kind quite
unlike that which may have existed in Solo Cup or Central Hard-
ware. Babcock was concerned with discrimination that allows an-
ti-union publicity while prohibiting pro-union dissemination.
The discrimination found by the Board in the two problem cases,
however, allowed persons having business with the employer to
come onto the premises while excluding union organizers. Logan
would not allow discrimination to prevent the exercise of con-
stitutional rights on quasi-public property. Yet it was not clear
that this precluded the uniform enforcement of a no-solicitation
rule which blocked the exercise of statutory rights. Marsh, upon
which Logan was largely based, had indicated that the opening
of private property by the owner for use by the public in general
causes the rights of the owner to become circumscribed by the
constitutional and statutory rights of the users.1r, This may have
provided the basis for the Board's contention that the owners'
opening of their property to the public prevented their enforcing
a rule which, in effect, would prevent certain members of that
public from exercising their statutory rights on the premises. The
discrimination, while not sufficient to bring the organizers under
149. See Broomfield, supra notes 41,49.
150. 326 U.S. at 506.
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the protection of the Babcock exceptions, was sufficient to bring
the activity under the protection of statutory rights alluded to
by Marsh and Logan.
B. The Relevance of the Character of the Land in Balancing
Competing Rights.
The character of the land on which organizational picketing
is conducted is highly relevant to a determination of the consti-
tutional or statutory propriety of employer interference with
such activity. In determining the constitutionality of the exclusion
of union organizers from company property, the Board recog-
nizes that organizational picketing is an exercise of free speech
and when conducted on quasi-public property is protected by the
first amendment. Therefore, if the property of the employer is
quasi-public within the meaning of Logan, the employer cannot
interfere with the exercise of the protected activity on his prop-
erty. The activity is constitutionally and statutorily protected
and employer interference would violate section 8(a) (1) of the
N.L.R.A.
If the property is not quasi-public in the Logan sense, its
character is still of interest to the Board. Although a constitu-
tional right to entry might not exist, statutory protection could
be found if a weakening of the employer's right to exclusion had
occurred.1r8 The constitutional and the statutory protection can
be distinct and the latter can be broader than the former.Y52 Thus
it is not essential that the property be as generally open to the
public as it was in Logan. A partial opening of the property by
the employer may sufficiently weaken the employer's interest to
enable the Board to provide statutory protection. 5 The NLRB
is free to fashion appropriate remedies to protect the organiza-
151. .The Board has recognized factors which sufficiently diminish an employer's
interest to allow access, which normally would not exist, to organizers. See, e.g., NLRB v.
United Steelworkers of America and Nutone, Inc., 357 U.S. 357. (1958), where a normally
valid "no-solicitation during working time" rule was enforced by an employer who himself
used working time to promote anti-union information. The Board held that this rule
would be unenforceable if a lack of equally effective channels of employee-union com-
munication could be shown.
152. See discussion note 159 infra.
153. The "discrimination" exception to Babcock is aimed at allowing access due to
such a weakening. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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tional rights of employers and employees.'6 4 The Board apparently
believes that the requirement of access is appropriate where the
employer has lost some measure of his right to exclusion and
where the employees are beyond the effective reach of reasonable
union efforts. This rule would not be applicable to the normal
private property case, where the right to exclusion would not
have been impaired. The fundamental difference between Bab-
cock and Central Hardware rested in the use to which the land
was put. This difference was sufficient to warrant contrasting re-
sults in the two cases. Both cases involved the balancing of com-
peting rights. The nature of the land in Central Hardware, how-
ever, was of sufficient weight to tip the balance to favor the union.
The rights of employers and employees in a labor dispute
are relative and depend on the nature of the situation.'" Certain
factors tend to strengthen or weaken the relative position of the
opposing parties. It is not unreasonable for the Board to consider
the degree to which the employer has opened his land to public
use as a factor which weakens the employer's position. Similarly,
it is not unreasonable for the Board to conclude that this factor
is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of access. As was noted
earlier, the Board has been charged with the accommodation of
competing interests.'56 This accommodation requires an identifi-
cation, examination and balancing of the rights of the parties
to the dispute. The rights of employees can be strengthened by
a showing of a lack of alternative channels of communication or
discrimination. 57 In much the same way, the rights of the em-
ployer can be strengthened where his use of the property will
be seriously impeded or threatened if access is allowed.," Appar-
ently the Board has concluded that the rights of the employer
can be weakened by an opening of his property which is some-
thing less than the opening which was involved in Logan. His
right to exclusion is thereby diminished. It is this diminished right
154. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
[T]hat Act left to the Board the work of applying the Act's general prohibitory
language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be
charged as violative of its terms.
Id. at 798.
155. See generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi.
Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1965).
156. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945).
157. They can be weakened where the likelihood of violence or interference with the
rights of -members of the public is high. See generally cases cited at supra note 101.
158. See May Department Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1962).
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which must be balanced against the organizational interest of
the employees, and this diminution may be sufficient to tip the
balance in favor of the employees.
C. The Modification of Babcock and Logan
In deciding Solo Cup and Central Hardware, the Board ap-
plied Babcock in conjunction with Logan. If a constitutional
right to engage in the activity on company property existed, the
interference with that right by the employer would have violated
section 8 (a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. The nature of the land in the
two cases, however, left some question as to the applicability of
the first amendment protection: the pure Logan test applied only
to the functional equivalent of a business block. Therefore, it was
necessary for the Board to decide whether statutory protection ex-
isted. '5 The Babcock test was applied, but it alone did not neces-
sarily protect the organizers: the pure Babcock test had applied
solely to traditional private property. Protection could be found
within Babcock and Logan only if their holdings were combined
and modified so as to favor the employees. Both of these cases had
been based on the accommodation of competing rights, i.e., both
had based the granting of access on the relative strength of the
Tights of the parties involved. Solo Cup and Central Hardware
were based on this same kind of balancing, and if the employer
had weakened his right to exclusion by a partial opening'60 of
his land to the public, and the union had a strengthened interest
in access due to the ineffectiveness'" of alternative channels of
communication, it would not be unreasonable for the balance
of interests to favor the union. The rule that emerged from Solo
Cup and Central Hardware modified Babcock and Logan and
extended statutory protection to union solicitation on private
company property if a limited opening by the owner and a lack
of effective alternatives could be shown. One might argue that
since the Seventh Circuit refused to allow the expansion in Solo
C-up, and the facts of Central Hardware placed the union acti-
159. Clearly a non-labor group would have no right to enter the property of Babcock
to disseminate anti-war pamphlets or religious literature or to solicit members for their
organizations. The statute has given to labor a right of entry which is not available to the
general public. The statutory right can be broader than the constitutional protection of
free speech or assembly.
160. Less than that involved in Logan.
161. Alternatives exist but are of dubious value.
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vity within the constitutional protection described in Logan, nei-
ther Babcock nor Logan was expanded. Monogram Models, Inc.,
and Scholle Chemical Corp. would lend some support to this con-
clusion because in each of these cases the Board applied only the
Babcock test. However the Board may have believed that a proper
balance in Monogram and Scholle could be reached through the
application of Babcock. Additionally, the Board may have real-
ized that although the facts of Monogram and Scholle closely
resembled those of Solo Cup, Solo Cup had extended Babcock
and Logan beyond the limits acceptable to the Seventh Circuit,
and an application of the Solo Cup reasoning to protect the
activity in Monogram or Scholle probably would have been
overruled. The Seventh Circuit had overruled the Board in
Solo Cup, but in Solo Cup the Board had made an attempt
to modify and expand the holdings of Babcock and Logan.
Central Hardware was a more "Logan like" site. However it was
not the functional equivalent of a business block and it would
have been beyond the narrow definition of quasi-public which was
used in Logan. Nevertheless the Board successfully applied the
modified Babcock and Logan holdings to protect the organiza-
tional activity of the union. These applications by the Board indi-
cate a projection of the protection of union organizers and the
recognition of two important factors in balancing the competing
rights of the parties involved; the extent to which the employer
has weakened his right to exclusion by the opening of his property
to the public, and the effectiveness of alternative channels of
employee-union communication.
D. The Propriety of These Decisions
There is some question as to the propriety of the Solo C up
and Central Hardware decisions. If the land had been opened to
charities or other solicitors, but closed to union organizers, an
intent to stifle organization would have been manifested. 10 2 But
where, as in the instant cases, the employer has uniformly enforced
a rule that prohibits all nonemployee solicitation on his property,
the anti-union motive is not clear. Additionally, it is difficult to
162. See NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 836 U.S. 226 (1949), where the employer's
refusal to allow the union to use the meeting hall in a company owned town was found
to be discriminatory because the hall had been available for use by other groups and
members of the community. This manifested an intent to stifle the organizational efforts
of the union.
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argue that the owner has forfeited his right to exclusion. Certain
property rights have been relinquished by the opening of the prop-
erty to members of the public. These forfeited rights, however,
are not necessarily intertwined with the right to exclude solicitors.
Thus it is possible that the employer has retained the only rights
he is seeking to assert and that the partial dedication of the pro-
perty for the limited use of members of the public would not
weaken his interest in the right retained.
"One additional factor should also be mentioned. The facts of
Central Hardware lead to the conclusion that the organizers were
interfering with the right of employees to refrain from organ-
izing.16 3 Such interference tends to weaken the right of the union
and this weakening could tip the balance to favor the employer.
It is possible that the Board did not consider or did not give suffi-
cient weight to this very important factor. Consequently, it is
possible that the balance struck by the Board was not proper.
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment has compared two recent Board decisions''
and has attempted to analyze them by first placing them into per-
spective, and second considering some of the issues that they
posed. In both decisions the Board was attempting to modify
existing case law to allow nonemployee union organizers to engage
in organizational activity on the property of the employer. This
involved a balancing of the competing interests and an interpre-
tation of case law to allow the protection of the organizers and
the employees who were favored by the balance. In both cases
the property had been opened to the public to a limited extent.
The Board modified the Babcock rule, which allows an employer
to validly post his property against union solicitation if alternative
channels of employee-union communication are within the reason-
able reach of union efforts and if the rule is not discriminatorily
enforced solely against the organizers, by applying it in conjunc-
tion with the Logan rule, which allows organizers to enter quasi-
public property. It concluded that if alternative channels were not
effective and if the employer had partially opened his property
to use by the public, the employer could be required to allow
163. 439 F.2d at 1324.
164. Solo Cup Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1968), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970),
and Central Hardware Co., 181 NLRB 74 (1970) modified, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
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access to the organizers. This represented a significant departure
from prior Board holdings which had strictly adhered to the
Babcock test. It recognized that in the same way as the right of
employees may become stronger when alternative channels do not
exist, the right of the employer may become weaker when he gives
up part or all of his interest in excluding solicitors. Although the
power of the Board to reach such a result is certainly within the
N.L.R.A. authorization, it is at least arguable that the employers
in the compared cases had not forfeited or weakened their right to
exclude solicitors.
The balancing of competing interests has always been a major
function of the Board in organizational picketing cases. As tra-
ditional property notions have become strained by the opening of
property to the public, the Board has been asked to give increased
weight to the nature of the property in arriving at a balance.
While at times the nature of the property or the use to which it
is put may favor the employer's enforcement of a no-solicitation
rule,'- occasionally the nature or use diminishes the force of the
employer's interest in exclusion."" The Board believed that the
use of the land'in the problem cases had this latter effect.
PAUL R. COMEAU
165. See May Department Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1962), enforcement de-
nied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963), where the rule was favored because the nature of the
store made solicitation by off-duty employees distracting or annoying to store customers,
166. Cf. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America and Nutone, Inc., 357 U.S. 857,
363.64 (1958).
